



T. OF THE OFFENCE AT COMMON LAW.
1. What constitutes a contempt.
(a) By any person. (b) By those acting in an official,
ministerial or some special capacity.
2. What is not a contempt.
3. Of direct and constructive contempts, and the proceedings
in case of contempt.
[1. OF THE PUNISHMENT OF CONTEMPT AT CO,.MON LAW.
1. Kind and degree thereof.
2. Avoidance of the punishment, or purging the contempt.
0. Of the punishment as a reemedy for civil wrongs to another
person.
III. OF THE POWER OF COURTS AT COMMON LAW TO PUNISH
CONTEMPT.
1. What courts possess this power.
2. The origin of the power.
3. The nature and extent of the power.
[V. OF STATUTORY CHANGES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE COM-
MON LAW AS TO CONTEMPT.
I. OF THE OFFENCE AT COMMON LAW.
1. What constitutes a contempt.
(a) By any person.
CONTEMPT, "is a disobedience to the rules and orders bf a court
which hath power to punish such offence." "And this word is
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used for a kind of misdemeanor, by doing what one is forbidden,
or not doing what he is commanded :" Jacob's Law Dictionary,
tit. Contempt.
Lord Chancellor HARDWICKE in 2 Atk. 469, says: "There
are three different sorts of contempt." "One kind of contempt
is scandalizing the court itself." "There may be likewise a con-
tempt of this court in abusing parties who are concerned in causes
here." "There may be also a contempt of this court in prejudicing
mankind against persons before the cause is heard."
Blackstone's definition is much more full and precise; he
-enumerates various contempts which may be committed by any one
"under the degree of a peer," and even by peers when enormous
and accompanied with violence, "such as forcible rescous, and the
like, or when they import a disobedience to the king's great pre-
rogative writs of prohibition, habeas corpus and the rest." "Some
of these contempts may arise in the face of the court, as by rude
and contumelious behavior; by'obstinacy, perverseness or prevari-
cation; by breach of the peace, or any wilful disturbance whatever:
others in the absence of the party, as by disobeying or treating
with disrespect the king's writ, or the rules or process of the
court, by perverting such writ or process to the purposes of private
malice, extortion, or injustice; by speaking or writing contemptu-
ously of the court or judges, acting in their judicial capacity; by
printing false accounts (or even true ones -without proper permission)
of causes then depending in judgment; and by anything in short,
that demonstrates a gross want of that regard -and respect which,
when once courts of justice are deprived of, their authority (so
necessary for the good order of the kingdom) is entirely lost among
the people :" 4 Blackstone 285; Vin. Abr., Contempt A.
In 2 Hawkins's Pleas of the Crown 220, "the most remarkable
instances of contempts," for which "any person whatsoever is
punishable," are reduced to the following heads: 1. Contempts
of the king's writ; 2. Contempts in the face of a court; 3. Con-
temptuous words or writings concerning the court; 4. Contempts
of the rules or awards of the court; 5. Abuse of the process of the
court; 6. Forgeries of writs, and other deceits of the like kind,
tending to impose on the court. "But against peers an attachment
for contempt lies for such only as are of an enormous nature."
"Anything either for the purpose of obstructing justice or which
will have that effect, may be punished as a contempt of the court
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before which the proceedings are had :" Rex v. Clement, 4 B. &
Ald. 233.
The clearness of these definitions needs but little illustration,
only cases specially noteworthy will therefore be cited.
Insulting language to a judge relative to his conduct in a suit
pending before him, even though out of court, is a contempt pun-
ishable by fine and imprisonment. The offender in this case was a
party to the suit, but this fact seems to have been considered
unimportant: Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408. See
also Charlton's Case, 2 Myl. & Cr. 316, where it is said by the
court: "Every insult offered to a judge in the exercise of the
duties of his office is a contempt."
An article, "tending to degrade and scandalize the court, to
overawe its deliberations and extort a decision against the accused,"
in a criminal case before it, and, " calculated to embarrass the
administration of justice," is a contempt and punishable as such.
Even though the publication were made in another city, it would
be "considered as done in the presence of the court:" People v.
Wilson, 64 Ill. 195 (1872). See also Hatter of Sturoc, 48 N. H.
428.
An attachment for contempt may be granted against one who
threatened the prosecutor of another person with danger of his
life, &c.: Rex v. Carroll, 1 Wilson 75. And for causing to be
arrested a plaintiff while attending arbitrators under a rule of
court, to prevent him from being heard: Rex v. Hall, 2 Bl. Rep.
1110.
Formerly it was held to be a contempt to publish an advertise-
ment as to proceedings in court: 2 Vesey 520. The power to
punish such acts as a contempt was taken away from the United
States courts by Act of March 2d 1831: United States v. Holmes,
Wall., Jr., 1. Advertising that a reward would be given for evi-
dence disproving a marriage adjudged by the Spiritual Court and
the Common Pleas, was punished as contempt, tending to suborna-
tion of witnesses: Pool v. Sacheverel, 1 P. Wins. 675.
It is a contempt to publish matter tending to prejudice and pre-
possess the minds'of the public or the jury, or to obstruct the
administration of justice, as to a cause in court; as by printing a
brief before the cause was heard: Com. Dig. Chancery, D 3;
2 Atkyns 469; Ex parte Jones, 13 Vesey, Jr., 237; Matter of
Sturoe, 48 N. H 428. Or after an order of court prohibiting the
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publication of reports of a trial: Rex v. Clement, 4 B. & Ald,
218. See also Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 819; Bayard v.
.Passmore, 3 Yeates 438; Hollingsworth v. Duane, Wall. 51;
. S. v. Duane, Id. 102.
It is a contempt to prevail on one's wife by menaces to put in an
answer against her belief: Com. Dig. Chancery, D 3; to sign a
counsel's name to a bill in equity without his consent: Com. Dig.
Attachment, A 2; Yates's Case, 4 Johns. 817; or put an attor-
ney's name to process without his authority: 1 Burr. 20; to appear
as an attorney without having been admitted: 2 Hawk. 210; Rex
v. Faulkner, 2 M. & A. Cas. in Bk. 843; to insert a defendant's
name in a writ after it is sealed: Com. Dig., supra ; or to alter a
writ: Hawk. 228 ; to put in bail in feigned names: Strange 304;
procure worthless bail and suborn perjury in connection therewith:
In re Lucas Tirst, 9 Phila. 216; H1ull v. L'Eplatimer, 49 How.
Pr. (N. Y.) 500.
It is a contempt to solicit a juror to give a signal after the jury
have retired, to indicate whether or not they are likely to agree,
and thereby to enable an outside party to make a bet on the ques-
tion of their agreement to better advantage; though nothing is
said by the person making the solicitation as to how he wishes the
jury to decide: State v. Doty, 8 Vroom (N. J.) 403.
Unfair practices toward a witness who is to give testimony in
court, or oppression under color of its process, although acted out
of the district in which the court was sitting, may be punished by
attachment, if the offender come within the jurisdiction of the
court: 1 Burr's Trial 352.
The definition of this offence has been held to include such acts
as using means to prevent and preventing a witness duly summoned
from attending court: Commonwealth v. Feely, 2 Va. Cas. 1.
So for an acquitted prisoner to threaten vengeance against the
witnesses within the precincts of the court: U, S. v. Carter; 8
Cr. C. C. 423. -To call another a liar in presence of a court, and
in hearing of its officers, is a contempt: United States v. .Emer-
son, 4 Cranch 0. Ch. 188. So to strike a defendant in the lobby
-of the court, after the trial was over:. Rex v. Wigley, 32 E. C. L.
Rep; 415. And arresting a, party or a witness (but not serving a
summons on him) while attending court, or serving process on him in
presence, actual or constructive, of the court: 2 Bishop's 0rim. Law,
sect. 252; Davis v. Sheeran, 1 Cranch C. C.- Rep. 287; United
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States v. Schofield, Id. 130; Blight v. Fisher, Peters 0. 0. 41;
see also Cole v. Hawkins, Strange 1094; And. 275. And send-
ing a fictitious letter, signed "summoning bailiff," to special jurors,
falsely stating that the trial was put off, whereby they were absent
at the trial: Rex v. Lucas et al., 3 Burr. 1564.
An attempt by a master to remove his slave beyond the juris-
diction of the court, pending a petition for freedom, is a contempt:
Richard v. 2M'eter, 3 Cr. 0. 0. 214; see also Thornton v. Davis,
4 Cr. C. 0. 500. And encouraging an infant ward of the Court
of Chancery to leave his committee, in whose care the court had
placed him, and to marry a ward of the court, even though the
parties concerned had no notice that the infant was a ward: Vin.
Abr. (A), pl. 46, 48. And carrying away an infant ward of the
court, from the person to whom it had been intrusted by the court,
and refusing to make known its whereabouts. So mustering a body
of militia so near a court as to disturb its deliberations: State v.
Coulter, Wright 421; State v. Goff, Id. 78. And taking papers
from the file of the court, and refusing to return them after being
so ordered: Barker v. Wilford, Kirby 235.
Where a corporation is enjoined from doing a certain act, every
member thereof who afterwards joins in doing that act is guilty of
contempt of court: Davis v. Mayor of N1ew York, 1 Duer (N. Y.)
457; People v. Compton, Id. 512.
An act which may clearly invade the constitutional powers of
the Supreme Court of the state, may be treated by it as a con-
tempt, and it can go beyond statute provisions to preserve and
enforce such powers: State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384.
A person assessed or taxed by reason of his personal property,
may be committed as for a contempt on account of neglect to pay
the tax. This was under the New York Statutes: Kahn's Case.
19 How. Pr. 475.
A purchaser at a master's sale, under decree of court, may be
attached for non-compliance with the terms: Haig v. Commissioner,
f Dessaus. (So. 0.) 112; Brasher v. Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Oh.
(N. Y ) 505.
Both grand and petit juries are part of the court while sitting,
It is a contempt for a witness or a bystander to communicate with
a grand juror touching a complaint under examination before them
without their request: Bergh's Case, 16 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 266.
Speaking 'disrespectfully of a grand jury, or publishing in a news-
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paper defamatory notices concerning them, is a contempt: Van
Hook's Case, 3 City Hall Rec. (N. Y.) 64 (1818); Matter of
Spooner, 5 Id. 109 (1820). But as to this point in Illinois, see
Storey v. -People, 79111. 45. Also sending a letter to a grand jury
to improperly influence them in a matter pending, or about to pend,
before them: Commonwealth v. rans, 3 Penna. Law Jour. 442
(1844). So, under the New York Revised Statutes, sending a
letter to a grand jury by a person, not an official, aspersing their
motives: Bergh's Case, supra.
(b) By those acting in an offcial, ministerial, or some &pecial
capacity.
Besides contempts of which any one may be guilty, there are
others which are constituted by the misbehavior of those in certain
positions, such as officers of the court or parties to proceedings
therein. These may be divided as follows:
1. Inferior judges and magistrates.
2. Counsellors at law.
•3. Officers of the court, which comprises attorneys and "others
acting as such," solicitors, sheriffs, bailiffs, gaolers and those per-
forming other like functions.
4. Jurors.
Hawkins, 2 P. C. 207, denominates those enumerated in the
last two divisions "ministers of the court."
5. Parties to proceedings before the court.
6. Witnesses: 2 Hawk. P. C. 206-7-17; 4 Bl. 284-5.
Both the public welfare and the dignity of courts of justice
require that they should have the power summarily and effectually
to restrain and punish wrongdoings by those whose official duties
are performed under their superintendence, who to some extent
share their powers or form a part of their machinery, as well as by
those who claim their aid to obtain or preserve their rights.
As regards those in official position, it may be laid down that all
corrupt conduct, oppression or injustice in execution of an office
by color thereof, gross or wilful neglect of duty, and generally all
misbehavior in office, constitutes a contempt of court: 2 Hawk. P.
0. 207-12-17; 4 Bl. 28, &c. The power of courts over this
offence may be exerted to punish the perversion, maladministration
or denial of justice by inferior judges or magistrates, "since the
superior courts have a general superintendence over all inferior
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jurisdictions," in all cases where these officers, 1. Proceed without
jurisdiction; 2. Or unjustly, oppressively or irregularly; 8. Re-
fuse to do justice; 4. Disobey the superior courts, as "by proceed-
ing in a cause after it is put a stop to or removed by writ of prohi-
bition, error or supersedeas, and the like ;" or, in short, are guilty
of "any corrupt or iniquitous practices:" 2 Hawk. 217 ; 4 BI.,
suyra. "All misdemeanors of judicial officers are contempts of
the Court of King's Bench :" Walk. 201. Refusing to seal a bill
of exceptions without sufficient cause, is a contempt on the part of
a Court of Common Pleas, and the Supreme Court (of New York)
will award a mandamus to compel the Court of Common Pleas to
*ign it. In this case, the bill of exceptions was untrue, which was
held sufficient cause for the refusal: -People v. The Judges of West-
chester, 2 Johns. Cas. 118; Pe~ple v. 7Vhe Judqes of Wa shington
Co., 2 Caines 97. See also Conrow v. Sehloss, 55 Penn. St. 28,
where it was held that the remedy was not by mandamus, but by
a special writ. And such contempt is punishable even though the
judge has since gone out of office, and is therefore no longer com-
pellable to sign the bill: -People v. Pearson, 3 Scam. 189.
Disobedience of a peremptory mandamus from the Supreme
Court of Georgia to a county court, held a contempt in Ex parte
Carnochan, Charlton 315 (1810). See also State v. HEunt, Coxe
-287 (1795); Patehn v. The Mayor of Brooklyn, 13 Wend. 664;
State v. Smith, 9 Iowa (With.) 334.
Counsellors at law in the United States are also attorneys. In
England it is otherwise; but the doctrine there is, that although
"they are neither officers of any court nor invested with any judi-
cial office," "they are punishable for any foul practice, as other
ministers of justice are :" 2 Hawk. P. C. 219.
It has been held a contempt in an attorney to attempt "any-
thirg which he cannot or ought not to do ;" "mishehave himself
in view of court, practise fraud or vexation to another under color
o)f legal procedure ;" act after being forejudged, i. e. disbarred:
Com. Dig., Attorney, B 13; Chancery, D 3; Attachment, A 2;
and not to put in his warrant of attorney till verdict or judgment:
Vin. Abr., Contempt, A 2; and a solicitor is liable for contempt
if lie be negligent in managing his client's business: Com. Dig.,
Chancery, D 3. But the misconduct of an attorney which will
constitute contempt, or which is punishable summarily by the court
in like manner, though not strictly a contempt, must have occurred
CONTEMPT OF COURT.
in the exercise of his office: Com. Dig., Attorneq, B 15; Com-
monwealth v. Newton, 1 Grant 453.
An attorney is punishable as for a contempt for " any base and
unfair dealing towards his client in the way of business ;" also for
disobedience of any rule of court, or "any such ill practice as is
against the known and obvious rules of justice and common hon-
esty;" for undertaking to appear and not doing so: 2 Hawk. P. C.
211, and note 1, 212; or for appearing and confessing judgment
without authority: Denton v. Noyes, 6 Johns. 296; for serving
process on a party attending his business in court: 2 Strange
1094; for assigning for error the death of a plaintiff in ejectment,
who is but nominal, the court saying, "it was to defeat the proceed-
ing instituted by the court to try the right:" Moore v. Goodright,
2 Str. 2899. See on this point generally, 1 Tidd's Pr., 3d Am.
ed. 88.
The court will relieve in a summary way against the misconduct
of an attorney: People v. Smith, 3 Caines 221.
For an attorney to write a letter to a judge, after learning of his
decision of a cause which he had argued before him, containing
sneering and insulting language concerning the decision, is a con-
tempt: Be Pryor, 18 Kansas 72.
A court has power to require members of its bar to purge them-
selves from a charge of contempt in assailing the integrity of the
court by a libellous publication, made by part of its bar: In the
Matter of Moore, 63 N. C. 397; see also -Ex parte Biggs, 64 N.
0. 202. Nor will the fact that such publication was made by an
attorney in his character as editor of a newspaper relieve him from
responsibility therefor as an attorney: Ex parte Greery, 4 Weekly
Notes of Cases (Philadelphia) 308; contra, Ex parte Steinman, 8
Id. 296; 9 Id. 145. •
As regards sheriffs, bailiffs of franchises and sheriffs' bailiffs,
they are guilty of this offence by "any corrupt practice" in rela-
tion to the service of writs, as by refusing to serve one unless paid
an unreasonable gratuity; receiving a bribe not to serve one; giv-
ing warning to defendant so as to prevent service; depriving the
party suing out the writ of its advantages, as by embezzling the
money from an execution; oppressive practices in executing writs,
as by "using needless force, violence and terror in making an
arrest ;" making unlawful arrests, or treating prisoners cruelly. and
making a false return: 2 Hawk. P. C. 208-9 and cases cited;
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Com. Dig., Attachment, A 2. And an attachment for contempt
will be issued against an under-sheriff for remitting part of a sen-
tence in not putting an offender properly in the pillory: 2 Burr.
792; and for redelivering a writ of appeal to an infant: 1 Salk.
176. For not returning a writ, a rule for an attachment was
granted, though twelve years had elapsed since the issue of the
writ: Brockway v. Wilber, 5 Johns. 356.
To pocket a venire is a contempt: .Keppele v. Williams, 1 Dall.
29 ; to pertinaciously refuse or culpably neglect to collect a debt in
gold or silver: Bice v. Alclintock, Dudley (So. C.) 354; to make
a levy after the appointment of a receiver: Commonwealth v.
Young, 33 Leg. Int. 160; Russel v. E. A. Railroad Co., 1 Eng.
L. & E. 101; for carelessly allowing a prisoner to escape: Craig
v. Haltbie, 1 Ga. 544; for not paying money collected on execu-
tion: U. S. Dig., Attachment, against a sheriff.
Gaolers "are not only punishable in this manner, as all other
officers are, by the courts to which they more immediately belong,
for any gross misbehavior in their offices, or contempts of the rules
of such courts, but they are also punishable by any other courts
for disobeying writs of habeas corpus, awarded by such courts."
And the Court of King's Bench, in virtue of its general superin-
tendency over all ministers of justice, "may award an attachment
against any gaoler using a prisoner barbarously and inhumanly:"
2 Hawk. P. C. 219.
Other officers of courts are: clerks and prothonotaries; receivers
appointed by a court; boards of canvassers of election; county
commissioners, in their function of selecting jurors, and those
filling similar positions.
Gross neglect on the part of a prothonotary of a court may con-
stitute official misconduct under the Pennsylvania Act of 3d April
1809, relative to contempt: Commonwealth v. Snowden, 1 Brews-
ter 218.
The embezzlement or misappropriation of funds, or the failure to
pay them over when so ordered, is a contempt on the part of a
receiver appointed by the court: Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 230.
The opinion of Chief Justice GRAY in this case is an admirable
statement, succinct but clear, of the nature and extent of the power
to punish for contempt.
An application to compel an officer of the court to pay over-
money due in his official capacity, is a proceeding for a contempt,
VOL. XXIX.-12
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and the court has jurisdiction under the Act of Congress of March
2d 1831: Pitman's Case, 1 Curtis C. C. 186.
When a court makes a corporation a depositary of the funds of
the court, and such corporation, through its officers, accepts the
deposit, it becomes pro hac vice an officer of the court, and failing,
upon the order of a writ, to return the money, without showing
some valid reason, it is guilty of contempt, and its officers having
control of the fund may be attached therefor: Re Western, &c.,
Insurance Co., 38 Ill. 289.
A public officer is guilty of contempt who refuses to furnish
copies of papers wanted on a trial, even though the application be
made after office hours: Delaney v. Regulators, 1 Yeates 403.
Referees under a rule of court who do not report, may be com-
pelled to do so by attachment. See cases cited U. S. Dig., Con-
tempt, pl. 54, 55.
County commissioners, in the selection of jurors, are officers of
the court, and as such liable to process under the Pennsylvania
Act 3d April 1809: Hummel & Bishoff's Case, 9 Watts 421.
Jurors act in a twofold capacity, a ministerial and a judicial.
While acting strictly within the latter, and deciding matters of
fact, jurors are entirely independent and irresponsible to the court
or any other power; according to the old authorities, the only
remedy against them for a false verdict being a writ of attaint.
In early English history, and as late as the time of Charles II.,
there are instances where both grand and petit jurors were pun-
ished, or held punishable, for "refusing to agree," "making false
oaths," "finding manifest offenders not guilty" (held by Lord
CoKE, 12 Rep. 23, 24, that they might be so charged in the Star
Chamber); finding an offender guilty of a less offence against
"clear evidence and the direction of the court," "going against
plain evidence and the direction of the court :" 2 Hawk. 214, 215.
"This question was at last fully considered and debated in Bu hell's
Case" (22 Car. 2 (1671), Vaughn 135), where the Common Pleas
determined "that the jury are by law the proper judges of matters
of fact, as the judges are of matter of law:" 2 Hawk., ,mrpra.
Even if they find "against the direction of the court in matter of
law, it will not follow they are therefore finable, for if an attaint
will lie upon the verdict so given by them, they ought not to be
fined or imprisoned by the judge for that verdict:" Vaughn 144.
In their ministerial capacity, i. e., "as persons bound to attend the
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court, in order to perform the duty for which they are returned,"
jurors are punishable for a contempt for making default when sum-
moned; refusing to be sworn, or to give any verdict; offering a
verdict to which all have not agreed; casting lots for a verdict;
separating from one another; eating or drinking without leave of
court; sending or receiving instructions from either party, much
more for receiving a bribe: 2 Hawk. P. 0. 212-14; Gourlay v.
Hutton, 10 Wend. 595; Harrison v. Rowan, 4 Wash. C. C. 32;
holding a communication, after retiring, with persons other than
officers of the court: The State v. Helvenston, R. M. Charlton 48;
conversing with a bystander during the trial of a cause; leaving the
court without consent of the court: Barlow v. State, 2 Blackford
114; Ex Tarte Hill, 3 Cowen 355; and so for a juror voluntarily
to express an opinion as to the guilt of a prisoner, for the purpose
of disqualifying himself: United States v. Devaughan, 3 Cr. C.
C. 84.
The 5th and 6th subdivisions comprehend persons concerned in
proceedings in court, viz.: Parties and witnesses.
In the first capacity, they are guilty of a contempt if they disobey
"any rule or order made in the progress of a case:" 4 B1. 284-5.
Any abuse of the process of the court is a contempt, as taking out
process without color of right; making use of it to help the juris-
diction of an inferior court, or in a vexatious manner, or oppress-
ively, or unjustly trying a feigned issue without consent of court:
2 Hawk. P. C. 222-3; bringing any action in the name of another
without his consent: Scott v. John, 15 Ala. 566; Butterworth v.
Siagg, 2 Johns. Cas. 291. It has even been questioned whether
an attachment for contempt would lie against an executor for dis-
obedience of a rule of court by his testator: O'Leary v. Harrison,
6 Jones Law 338.
In chancery, an attachment for contempt lies for not appearing
to a subpcena; "for not answering or for answering insufficiently;"
"for refusal to obey an order or decree;" "for abusive usage or
words of the process or officers of the court ;" "for the revocation
of a submission to an award made in court by consent;" "for not
perfirming an award made upon a reference by rule of court :"
Coin. Dig.: Chancery, D 3; Attachment. For contemptuous
words on delivery of a declaration in ejectment: Bex v. Unitt,
Str. 567. After a party's business is done, to refuse to pay the
fees of the court officer therefor, is a contempt, and the party will
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be committed until payment:. Bac. Abr. 466, Attachment. For a
defendant in an execution to institute an action of replevin, is a
contempt of the dourt which rendered the judgment on which exe
cution issued: Philips v. Harris, 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 124; and
where an attachment has been made in a chancery suit, for the
defendant to take the property attached from the possession of the
officet by writ of replevin: Biggs v. Garrard, 6 B. Mon. 484.
Filing a bill in the county court on the same grounds as one in
the Chancery Courts of Maryland, by the decree in which a party
felt himself aggrieved, without communicating the proceedings in
the Court of Chancery, is a contempt of the county c6urt: Penn v.
Brewer, 12 Gill & J. (Md.) 113. For a party, when books are
submitted to his inspection by order of court, to break open parts
sealed up, not relating to the subject of litigation, is a contempt:
Dias v. Merle, 2 Paige 494. It is a contempt to make default
when summoned as a witness, to refuse to be sworn or examined
as a witness, or to "prevaricate in their evidence when sworn :" 4
B1. 284-5; Rez v. Lord Preston, 1 Salk. 278; Commonwealth v.
Roberts, 2 Pa. L. J. R. 340. But the witness must be material: 2
Hawk. P. C. 220, note 1; U. S. Dig. 5, Attachment, C, pl. 288,
Tial of Smith & Ogden.
Failing to appear before an examiner after being subpoenaed, is
a contempt of the process of the law, though not of court, and the
examiner has powei to punish by fine: Commonwealth v. .rewtbn,
1 Grant (Pa.) 453. In Pennsylvania, it is provided by statute
(Act February 24th 1870, Pamph. L. 34, Purd. Dig. 1478) that
persons summoned as witnesses in certain criminal cases, and who
abscond, shall be guilty of a misdemeafior, punishable by fine and
imprisonment. "This is intended to apply to cases where the
party in contempt could not be reached by attachment:" Common-
wealth v. Phillips, 3 Pittsburgh 426.
Two cases, very interesting as touching tlae liberty of donscience,
are reported in Stansbur v. Marks, 2 Dall. 213 (1793), and
United States v. Coolidge, 2 Gall. 364 (1815). In the first, a
Jew, who refused to be sworn as a witness in a cause tried on Sa-
turdiy because it was his sabbath, was fined by the court; in the
second, a person not a Quaker, but who had conscientious scruples
against taking an oath, on account of a vow that he never would
do so, and therefore refused to be sworn, was committed for con-
tempt, the-liberty of affirming being restricted to Quakers under
